This paper shows that the novel gains from trade liberalization driven by intra-industry reallocations (Melitz (2003)) are not robust to changes in the preference structure. In the Melitz (2003) setting the unambiguousness of the welfare e¤ect depends crucially on the assumption of traditional CES preferences, which ensures equivalence of the market equilibrium and the social planner solution. For other preferences this equivalence is broken and trade liberalization may reduce welfare by magnifying market failures. An exact condition for trade liberalization to reduce overall welfare is derived under the assumptions of generalized CES preferences and a speci…c distribution (Pareto) of …rm heterogeneity.
Introduction
The advent of a third consensus model in international trade heralds novel gains from trade liberalization. It is a novel and widely noted prediction of the seminal paper 'The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and aggregate productivity'by Marc Melitz (Melitz (2003) ) that trade liberalizations induce unambiguous welfare improving intra-industry reallocations among heterogenous …rms. Firm heterogeneity in productivity combined with …xed costs of production and exporting implies that …rms self-select into exiters, non-exporters and exporters. Trade liberalization therefore impacts di¤erently on di¤erent …rms, and market shares shift from lowproductivity non-exporting …rms towards high-productivity exporting …rms. This in turn improves overall production e¢ ciency. Intra-industry reallocations improve welfare due to changes in average productivity and in the number of varieties available to consumers and are by now widely accepted as an important source of gains form intra-industry trade.
The main contribution of the present paper is to show that the aggregate gains from trade liberalization in the Melitz (2003) framework are not robust to changes in the utility speci…cation. The …nding that with …rm-heterogeneity trade liberalization brings some negative elements to the welfare calculus is by no means new (see e.g. Montagna (2001) , Melitz (2003) , Jørgensen and Schröder (2008) , Demidova and Rudríguez-Clare (2009) and Baldwin and Forslid (2010) ); yet what is new is that the actual balance of positive and negative contributions may tip, such that the aggregate e¤ect from multilateral trade liberalization on welfare may become negative even when countries are symmetric. 1 The gains from trade liberalization may turn into pains from trade liberalization when preferences are not of the traditional CES type assumed in Melitz (2003) . Trade liberalization is traditionally modelled as a reduction in real trade costs (iceberg) and therefore corresponds to 1 In fact Montagna (2001) identi…es overall negative welfare e¤ects comparing situations of freetrade with autarky for asymmetric countries, see the detailed discussion below. Furthermore, negative net-welfare e¤ects from multilateral trade liberalization among symmetric countries are found in Jørgensen and Schröder (2008) in a setting with symmetric countries and …xed export costs heterogeneity, while Melitz (2003) and Baldwin and Forslid (2010) arrive at overall positive welfare e¤ects, despite identifying possible negative contributers to welfare. Demidova and Rodríguez-Clare (2009) show, albeit in a small open economy setting, that introducing an import tari¤ or an export tax improves welfare as they counteract existing market failures. an improved export technology which naturally improves welfare in the social planner equilibrium. Thus ampli…ed market failures are the source of a possible welfare loss from trade liberalization. In the Melitz (2003) setting with increasing returns and monopolistic competition market failures are generally present. However, in the special case of traditional CES preferences market failures cancel out and trade liberalization becomes unambiguously welfare improving. That market failures cancel out in this case is a central point of Benassy (1996) 2 , albeit derived for a closed economy with homogenous …rms. In particular, Benassy (1996) shows that a necessary condition for the social planner optimum in a monopolistic industry to coincide with the market equilibrium is that the taste for variety must be linked to the elasticity of demand exactly as it is in the case with traditional CES preferences.
Increases in the number of varieties due to trade have been shown to be important quantitatively and have important welfare consequences (see e.g. Weinstein (2004 and 2006) ). However, the monopolistic trade model of Krugman (1980) with traditional CES preferences and homogenous …rms overstates the welfare gains from increases in the number of varieties (see Ardelean (2009) ). Generalized CES preferences, used in the present paper, extend traditional CES preferences by including a separate taste of variety parameter and thereby break the link between taste of variety and the elasticity of substitution implied by traditional CES preferences. Generalized CES preferences are thus able to capture that increases in the number of varieties are important but not necessarily as important as suggested by the traditional CES preferences. 3 Generalized CES aggregates are not new to trade theory. In a monopolistic competition setting Ethier (1982) considers a generalized CES production function de…ned over an endogenous set of intermediate inputs to analyze the interaction between increasing returns at the …rm level (due to …xed costs of production) and at the aggregate level (due to taste of variety over intermediate inputs). The assumption of a generalized CES production function is equivalent to an assumption of generalized CES preferences from a welfare perspective as varieties of the intermediate input and the production function of the homogenous and non-traded …nal good may be reinterpreted as varieties of a …nal good and as a utility function, respectively. More recently generalized CES preferences/production functions have been applied in a 
The model
This section provides a version of the Melitz (2003) model, with n + 1 symmetric countries, but augmented by the assumption of generalized CES preferences, which breaks the important but arbitrary link between taste of variety and the elasticity of substitution between any two goods (and thus the elasticity of demand) implied by traditional CES preferences. In line with the literature only steady-state equilibria with no time discounting is considered.
Households
The representative household chooses consumption to maximize utility
is the traditional CES consumption aggregate from the Melitz (2003) model, varieties are indexed by !; is the set of varieties, M t is the measure of varieties available to the consumers, > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties, and the crucial new parameter v 0 measures the taste of variety. 4 For example, preferences display no taste of variety for v = 0, while for v = 1 1 , i.e. U = Q, we arrive at the traditional Melitz (2003) model. Optimal demand reads
where E is nominal expenditures and P; being the price of one unit of Q; reads
As the measure of varieties, M t , is exogenous demand is not a¤ected by the taste of 4 If the household consumes the same amount (q) of each variety utility is given by
For a given total consumption (M t q) the elasticity of utility wrt. the measure of available varieties reads dU dMt Mt U Mtq …xed
variety, v. This in turn implies that the market outcome corresponds to the market outcome in Melitz (2003) . Finally, each of the L households exogenously supplies one unit of labour.
Firms
To enter the monopolistic industry …rms face sunk costs of developing a new variety (F E ). 5 A random variety/…rm speci…c marginal productivity, ' (!), is associated with each variety immediately after development. 6 Production exhibits increasing returns as …rms face …xed costs of production (F ). Export requires the …rm to pay …xed export costs of F X per export market and variable iceberg trade costs, 1,
i.e. …rms have to ship units for one unit to arrive at the export market. Due to symmetry in preference a …rm is fully characterized by marginal productivity and the …rm/variety identity ! is suppressed in the following.
As …rms cf. (3) face a constant elasticity of demand, , they set prices as a constant mark-up on marginal costs, implying
where subscript D (X) refers to the domestic (export) market. Using (3) and (5) ‡ow pro…ts in the domestic and in each export market read
where B 5 The costs consist of employing F E units of labour. However, as we set the wage w to be the numeraire (w 1) the costs equal F E . 6 When marginal productivity is revealed the innovation costs (F E ) are sunk, i.e. …rms are uncertain about their productivity prior to entry. In the related paper of Montagna (2001) an exogenous pool of heterogenous potential entrants know their productivity prior to endogenous entry. the exit and export threshold is de…ned by D (' ) = 0 and X (' ) = 0. The self-selection occurs as ‡ow pro…ts increase in productivity, ', and only …rms with su¢ ciently high productivity can recover their …xed costs. As the country has n trading partners total ‡ow pro…ts read
There is free entry into the industry. Accordingly …rms enter until expected ‡ow pro…ts equal sunk costs of entry, i.e. until
where assumed to be drawn from the Pareto distribution
where ' 0 and k > 1 are scale (lower bound) and shape parameters. 7 The exit and export thresholds are determined from the free entry condition (8) and read
The assumed partitioning of …rms (the empirically relevant case) occurs for ' 0 < 7 The assumption of k > 1 is necessary to bound expected pro…ts from above.
' < ' X where the latter inequality requires that 1 F X F > 1, i.e. that trade costs are su¢ ciently high. If the latter inequality is violated all active …rms export and the exit and export thresholds collapse to a common threshold of
It is throughout assumed that min f' ; ' T RADE g > ' 0 , i.e. that some …rms choose to leave the industry.
Aggregation
The price index (4) of Q becomes
where M t = M +nM x = M +np x M is the mass of varieties available to the consumers (M domestic and np x M imported). Average productivity reads
where' (' ) =
is average factory gate productivity among domestic (foreign) …rms serving the domestic market. Average productivity is measured at the market place and therefore factory gate productivity of exported goods is corrected for trade costs. 8 The assumptions of no time discounting and free entry imply no returns to savings and zero aggregate pro…ts. Accordingly total income equals labour income, 8 See Melitz (2003) for further discussion. 9
i.e. E = L. Given the thresholds (10) and (11) the mass of varieties follows from the exit condition D (' ) = 0:
Similarly, in equilibria in which all active …rms export aggregate variables becomẽ
Trade liberalization and welfare
Welfare is given by indirect utility and using (13) it reads
Welfare increases in the mass of varieties (M t ) and in average productivity' t . The importance of the mass of varieties relative to average productivity is captured by our taste of variety parameter v 0. To obtain a better understanding of when and why trade liberalization may reduce welfare the e¤ects on mass of varieties and average productivity are analyzed before turning to welfare. Here we focus on a reduction in variable trade costs, . The corresponding analysis for a reduction in …xed trade costs, F X , is brie ‡y covered in the Appendix.
Varieties
The e¤ect of trade liberalization on the mass of varieties derives from (16) and
Proposition 1 In equilibria in which …rms are partitioned into exporters and nonexporters the mass of varieties increases (decreases) due to lower iceberg trade costs if F X < F (F X > F ). In equilibria in which all active …rms export iceberg trade costs have no impact on the mass of varieties.
The mass of varieties increases (decreases) for F X < F (F X > F ). For F X > F export market activity requires more labour for the marginal exporting …rm than domestic market activity does for the marginal …rm, and an additional exporter therefore squeezes more than one non-exporter out of the market. 9 The mass of varieties decreases accordingly as trade liberalization increases entry into the export market. That trade liberalization may reduce the mass of varieties when trade costs are high was suggested by Melitz (2003) . Baldwin and Forslid (2010) later derived the exact condition for the Pareto distribution and denoted such a reduction in the mass of varieties as an anti-variety e¤ect of trade liberalization. Yet, as will become clear below the anti-variety e¤ects does not need to be the driver behind a negative welfare impact of trade liberalization.
Average productivity
The e¤ect of trade liberalization on average productivity derives from (15) and 9 Recall that labour is the only factor of production and thus determines the mass of …rms.
Proposition 2 In equilibria in which …rms are partitioned into exporters and nonexporters average productivity increases (decreases) due to lower iceberg trade costs if
In equilibria in which all active …rms export reductions in iceberg trade costs always increase average productivity.
As noted by Melitz (2003) , without pinning down explicit conditions as in Propo- In equilibria in which all …rms export trade liberalization has no impact on the industry structure. 10 Accordingly, trade liberalization will not imply intra-industry reallocations and average productivity increases as productivity measured at the export market increases.
When …rms are partitioned into exporters and non-exporters there is still the e¤ect that among exporting …rms productivity measured at the export market in- 10 Formally, ' T RADE does not depend on , cf. (12) creases which tends to increase average productivity. However, there is a counteracting e¤ect due to market share reallocations. In particular among ex-ante nonexporting …rms the most productive begin to export and the least productive leave the industry. For F X < F the productivity of the marginal exporter measured at the export market is below the productivity of the marginal domestic …rm measured at the domestic market as less …xed costs have to be recovered in the export market, i.e. 1 ' X < ' , and the intra-industry reallocation tends to reduce average productivity. Obviously, the former e¤ect is stronger when initial trade is large and thus adverse e¤ects on average productivity from intra-industry reallocations are more likely at the outset of a liberalization process.
Welfare
The welfare e¤ect of trade liberalization is a weighted average of the e¤ects on the mass of available varieties and average productivity. The taste of variety parameter is central as it captures the relative weight of the mass of varieties. From the welfare expression (19) it follows that
and inserting (20)- (23) gives
The following result follows immediately. k v
Proposition 3 shows the main result of the paper, namely that trade liberalization may reduce welfare when preferences are not traditional CES preferences, i.e. when v 6 = 1 1 . This is an important result, as it shows that the …nding of unambiguous gains from trade liberalization in the Melitz (2003) model is sensitive to the speci…c utility formulation.
Another interesting implication of Proposition 3 is that welfare reducing trade liberalizations are ceteris paribus more likely for high iceberg trade costs, , i.e. for trade liberalization among less integrated economies, and when …rms are less heterogenous, high k.
Corollary 4 Trade liberalization increases welfare in the special case of traditional CES preferences, i.e. for v = 1 1 , and in the special case where …xed costs of exporting equals …xed costs of production, i.e. for F X = F . Moreover, trade liberalization increases welfare when all active …rms export.
Corollary 5 Trade liberalization decreases welfare when 1) F X > F and v is su¢ciently large and 2) F X < F X (F X is de…ned in Proposition 2), is su¢ ciently high and v is su¢ ciently small.
From Propositions 1 and 2 it follows that trade liberalization does not simultaneously have adverse e¤ects on average productivity and the mass of available varieties.
Corollary 4 states that the net e¤ect on welfare is always positive in the special case of traditional CES preferences, i.e. for a taste of variety given by v = 1 1 . In this case potential losses in one dimension (varieties or productivity) is more than o¤set by gains in the other dimension. For F X = F and/or when all …rms export welfare improves as the mass of varieties in unchanged and average productivity increases, 11 Recall that F X The potential welfare loss in Area B arises due to excess entry into the export market from a social point of view. The excess export market entry boosts the mass of available varieties but at the cost of lower average productivity, cf. Proposition 1 and 2, and this reduces welfare if the taste of variety is su¢ ciently low. In Area D the potential welfare loss is also related to excess entry into the export market as each newly imported variety squeezes more than one existing domestic variety out of the market and thereby reduces the total mass of available varieties, cf. Proposition 1. In both cases the welfare loss occurs due to a market failure in the sense that trade liberalization magni…es the excess entry into the export market.
In the special case of traditional CES preferences, v = 1 1 , the market equilibrium coincides with the social planner solution and trade liberalization therefore unambiguously improves welfare in this case as 'the budget set'of the social planner expands when real trade costs fall. The social planner solution is considered in the Appendix.
Conclusion
This paper has challenged the conventional view that trade liberalization unambiguously increases welfare due to intra-industry reallocations in settings of heterogenous …rms a'la Melitz (2003) . It has been shown that the welfare e¤ect of trade liberalization is only unambiguously positive because the assumed CES preferences imply that the market equilibrium coincides with the social planner solution. For other preferences there will in general be market failures due to the presence of increasing returns and imperfect competition. Trade liberalization can amplify these market failures, such that the overall welfare e¤ect from trade liberalization turns negative.
The present work exempli…ed this possibility by considering generalized CES preferences that break the crucial but arbitrary link between the taste of variety and the elasticity of substitution implied by the traditional CES preferences, assumed in settings following Melitz (2003) . For this speci…c class of preferences it is shown that welfare may in fact be reduced following trade liberalization due to excess export market entry (market failure). The possible adverse welfare e¤ect of trade liberalization appears particularly interesting because it derives in a setting of symmetric countries. This implies that trade liberalization potentially reduces welfare in all involved countries and thus globally.
The possibility of a negative welfare e¤ect from trade liberalization in a slightly more general Melitz (2003) setting stresses the importance of careful robustness checks of trade models along several dimensions before turning to policy advises.
However, the present analysis also implies an expanded scope for trade policy. The possible negative welfare e¤ects from trade liberalization through a reduction in real trade costs when assuming generalized CES preferences occur due to excess entry into the export market, and this excess entry may be counteracted through trade policy by increasing/introducing tari¤s or arti…cial export market entry barriers including …xed costs of exporting. Such interactions between reduced real trade costs, market failures and facilitating trade policies is an important topic for future research.
Appendix

Social planner solution/equilibrium
Generalized CES preferences
In the social planner optimum the marginal rates of substitution must equal the corresponding marginal rates of transformation for all produced varieties. Moreover, due to increasing returns (…xed costs of production and …xed costs of exporting) the social planner will only let high productivity …rms/varieties absorb these …xed costs. Accordingly, the social planner will partition …rms/varieties into exiters, nonexporters and exporters. Let' and' X denote these productivity thresholds.
Setting marginal rates of substitution equal to the corresponding marginal rates of transformation implies that
where q (') (q X (')) denotes consumption of a domestic (imported) variety produced with marginal productivity '. The constraint of the social planner reads
k is the fraction of varieties exported. The objective of the social planner is given by
The social planner problem can be formulated as
and the optimality conditions read Isolate q (' ) in @U @q(' ) = 0, insert this into @U @' = 0 and @U @ ' X '
= 0 and use that productivities are Pareto distributed to obtain
Unfortunately, due to the non-linearities closed form solutions of the social planner problem cannot be derived. However, it follows straightforwardly that in contrast to the market equilibrium the social planner solution depends on v.
Traditional CES preferences
In the special case of traditional CES preferences (as in Melitz (2003)), v = 1 1 , there is a closed form solution to the social planner problem, i.e. to (24) and (25), and it readŝ
It follows that the social planner thresholds are identical to the market equilibrium thresholds (10) and (11) . Moreover, relative quantities are also identical due to constant elasticities of demand and constant mark-ups. Finally, absolute demand for each variety is also the same as @U @' = 0 ) q (' ) =' ( 1) F D (' ) = 0 ) p D (' ) 1 ' q (' ) = F ) q (' ) = ' ( 1) F when noting that' = ' . Hence the social planner solution coincides with the market equilibrium in the case of traditional CES preferences.
Trade liberalization through lower …xed trade costs
The impact on welfare of lower …xed trade costs is given by
It follows that trade liberalization reduces welfare in equilibria in which all active …rms export provided v < 1 k . Similarly, trade liberalization reduces welfare in equilibria in which active …rms are partitioned into non-exporters and exporters if h
In both types of equilibria the assumption of traditional CES preferences, i.e. v = 1 1 , ensures welfare gains as k > 1.
The e¤ect on the mass of available varieties and average productivity can be derived similarly. Figure 2 below summarizes these e¤ects Figure 2 : E¤ects of lower …xed trade costs
